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INTRODUCTION 
School is a place where students are expected to learn and become 
prepared to enter the outside world. It is not a cocoon for young people 
to be protected from the realities they will inevitably face. It is in this 
spirit that dress codes, especially as they relate to young girls in public 
schools, should be reexamined by the courts. 
Toward the beginning and end of the school year in the United 
States, the weather is often quite hot. Many schools require students to 
sit outside during lunch or spend time outdoors for physical education.
1
 
As a result, boys and girls alike often choose to wear clothing that will 
keep them cool. Most will not don apparel considered inappropriate by 
reasonable standards; most students wear clothing purchased for them 
by their parents and are likely not allowed to leave their homes for 
school if their parents disapprove of their clothing choice.
2
 Within this 
reality, public school dress codes often seek to create another layer of 
protection for students, encouraging appropriate dress in order to keep 
students focused on education and not what others are wearing. But, 
lurking within this very noble goal lies the very real threat of 
suppressing students’ basic rights of expression and, even more 
frequently, a perpetuation of archaic sexist standards. 
As the law currently stands, both in California and at the federal 
level, a female student challenging sexist dress code practices stands 
little to no chance of success in court. When a fourteen-year-old girl is 
taken out of class and told to change her clothes because her shoulders 
are exposed or that five inches of her leg above the knee is exposed 
instead of the acceptable four, she deserves to have the opportunity to 
challenge it. This practice is all too common throughout the nation
3
, 
 
 1. This author attended a public high school in California where temperatures in 
September and May were regularly over ninety degrees, and all students were required to sit 
outside during lunchtime, where shade from trees or buildings was scarce.  
 2. This certainly is not true for all public school students, but hopefully serves to 
illustrate a typical case.  
 3. E.g. Brenda Álvarez Girls Fight Back Against Gender Bias in School Dress Codes, 
NEA TODAY, January 6, 2016, 
http://neatoday.org/2016/01/06/school-dress-codes-gender-bias/; Li Zhou, The Sexism of 
School Dress Codes, THE ATLANTIC, October 20, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/school-dress-codes-are-
problematic/410962/;  
Gabrielle Sorto Student Protests Growing Over Gender-Equal Dress Codes, CNN, February 
25, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/living/dress-code-protests-irpt/;  
Soraya Chemaly, Every Reason Your School’s Gendered Dress Code is Probably a Sexist 
Mess, THE HUFFINGTON POST, September 25, 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/every-reason-your-
schools_b_8147266.html; Jessica Valenti, Are Prudish School Dress Codes Targeting Girls 
in Violation of Discrimination Laws?, ALTERNET,  September 17, 2014, 
http://www.alternet.org/gender/are-prudish-school-dress-codes-targeting-girls-violation-
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and even in California, where gender discrimination is given stronger 
treatment than at the federal level. The law should be an equalizer, yet 
it cannot accomplish that task when precedent dictates that a court will 
not even reach the merits in a case such as this. 
This paper will outline the evolution of dress code challenges 
through freedom of expression since the 1960s, as well as the 
development of gender discrimination challenges, showing how these 
two overlapping issues here deserve different treatment by the courts. 
This history will be shown through federal law, as well as controlling 
law specific to California, due to the difference between California and 
federal standards. This paper will then present a proposed presumption 
of discrimination for courts to use in cases such as this in order to allow 
the greatest efficacy in the legal system. This will allow courts to 
review discrimination challenges to dress codes to be reviewed on their 
merits, rather than hindered by the current framework of judicial 
review. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Sexism in dress codes involves two interrelated constitutional 
issues: freedom of expression under the First Amendment,
4
 and equal 
protection.  Equal protection is treated under both the Fourteenth 
Amendment
5
 and the California constitution.
6
 The development of the 
law in each of these areas will be discussed in turn. 
A.  Freedom of Expression 
When clothing choice becomes an issue, the first concern most 
people would have involves freedom of expression; free speech 
through the First and Fourteenth Amendments protects the right to 
express yourself in whatever way you choose.
7
 But this right is not 
absolute. The Supreme Court has put a number of limits on what 
speech qualifies as protected.
8
 The Court has not specifically addressed 
dress codes in schools since the 1969 in the landmark case Tinker v. 
 
discrimination-laws. 
 4. U.S. Const. amend. I.  
 5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  
 6. Cal. Const. art. I §§ 11, 21. 
 7. The First Amendment has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, requiring the state governments, which regulate public schools in each state, to 
comply with First Amendment protections. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 8. For example, hate speech and obscenity are not protected by the First Amendment.  
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (regarding the permissible punishment of 
‘fighting words’ under the First Amendment); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957) (detailing the test of what constitutes ‘obscene material’ unprotected by the First 
Amendment). 
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Des Moines County Independent School District.
9
 
In December of 1965, John Tinker and a few of his friends 
planned to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam 
War.
10
 The administrators of the school told them that if they indeed 
did as they planned, they would be asked to leave school until they 
returned without the armbands.
11
 Tinker sued the school district for 
violating his First Amendment right to free speech.
12
 The Supreme 
Court found that the armbands they were wearing in order to protest the 
war were akin to “pure speech” in that they were symbolic of the 
message they sought to convey, therefore falling under the protection 
of the First Amendment.
13
   
Further, because neither students nor teachers shed their 
Constitutional rights upon entering a school, the protection of the First 
Amendment still applies in the school setting.
14
 This setting, however, 
presents particular concerns for safety and the educational mission, and 
therefore presents a conflict between school rules and Constitutional 
guarantees.
15
 The school district argued that their rule was valid 
because it properly prevented disruption and disturbance to the learning 
environment and protected against discord grown from divisive 
viewpoints.
16
 The Court held that this “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to 
freedom of expression.”17 The school must show facts that would lead 
them to forecast substantial disruption and interference with school 
activities.
18
  Short of that, the school is impermissibly suppressing free 
expression in order to avoid the discomfort of unpopular opinions.
19
 
The Tinker court specifically stated that its holding does not relate 
to regulating “the length of skirts or type of clothing, to hair style or 
deportment.”20  The Tinker test only applies to symbolic speech in 
schools where the wearer intends a particular message to be conveyed 
by their vestments.
21
  The average student’s clothing usually only 
reflects the wearer’s preference, and others would probably view the 
 
 9. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  
 10. Id. at 504.  
 11. Id.  
 12. See id.  
 13. Id. at 505–06.  
 14. Id. at 506.  
 15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).  
 16. Id. at 508.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 514.  
 19. Id. at 509.  
 20. Id. at 507–08.  
 21. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  
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clothing as conveying just that.
22
 The Ninth Circuit took exactly this 
view.
23
 
While generic clothing cannot be construed as symbolic speech, a 
number of circuit courts have addressed protection of other aspects of 
appearance. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a huge number of cases 
were brought by boys challenging school rules regarding hair length.
24
  
It was the style at the time for boys to wear their hair long, and schools, 
in an effort to keep their students clean-cut and presentable, instituted 
provisions in their dress code mandating how long boys were allowed 
to wear their hair.
25
  Many courts during this time agreed that there was 
a Constitutional right to govern one’s own appearance.26 Absent the 
symbolic speech discussed in Tinker, these courts agree that the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech did not protect choice of hairstyle 
because there is no intended message to be conveyed.
27
 
These courts have sought to find another source for the right to 
choose one’s appearance. The Ninth Amendment protects the rights of 
the people not otherwise enumerated with specific protection in the Bill 
of Rights.
28
  The right to one’s appearance has been viewed as fitting 
within this vein.
29
  Others have found the right as one of liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment
30
 or within the penumbra of privacy described 
by the Supreme Court as being found generally within the Bill of 
Rights.
31
 Regardless of where this right comes from, it has been 
recognized by a number of Circuit courts, and state courts and has 
never been contradicted by the Supreme Court.
32
 
Under this view, courts have found that students do have a right to 
control their own appearance and wear their hair how they wanted.
33
  
Schools, however, do have the right to promulgate rules that protect 
 
 22. King v. Saddleback Jr. Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that 
the regulation for hair length was not intended to curtail speech rights, and the students in 
violation did not have any intention of using their hair as a symbol for any kind of speech). 
 23. See id.   
 24. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 
(7th Cir. 1969); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) DOC9; Crews v. 
Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 25. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286; Breen, 419 F.2d at 1035. 
 26. See Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1075; Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036; Richards, 424 F.2d at 
1285. 
 27. E.g. Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1074–75.  
 28. U.S. Const. amend. IX. 
 29. Bishop, 450 F.2d at 1075. 
 30. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1284.   
 31. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263–64 (7th Cir. 1970).   
 32. The right to one’s appearance has been found to fall under the “liberty umbrella” of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the California Constitution by California courts.  
Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 334 (1971). 
 33. Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286. 
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student safety and further the educational mission.
34
  Rules that infringe 
on students’ rights, therefore, must be tailored to further permissible 
goals.
35
 In the aforementioned cases, hair length regulations were 
defended as promoting hygiene and preventing distraction.
36
 Courts 
have come out both ways on this issue, some finding that schools could 
permissibly regulate hair length,
37
 and others finding that the 
regulations were unrelated to the suggested justifications.
38
 
Just as Tinker did not extend its holding to regulations on “the 
length of skirts” or other non-symbolic clothing choices,39 some of 
these hair length cases have similarly excluded clothing from their 
holdings.
40
  As justification for this, the First Circuit stated that 
clothing can be changed depending on the setting—that clothing one 
wears to school can be easily changed from what could be worn 
elsewhere—while hair is a more permanent part of one’s own 
appearance, not as easily adjusted for different circumstances.
41
  
Similarly, justification for “skirt length” regulations in schools would 
be easier to find than one for hair length.
42
  Courts have not addressed 
hair length or other appearance-related cases in this vein since the 
1970s, as changes in cultural views of appearance led to looser school 
rules, prompting fewer challenges.
43
 
There are plenty of very worthy dress code provisions at schools 
all around the country that do not infringe upon free expression, 
allowing the schools to achieve their educational goals in a safe 
environment.  California’s Education Code, for example, even has 
specific provisions for dress code regulations as it relates to safety.
44
  
Students in California public schools have the right to be safe and 
secure in their person while at school.
45
  To this end, the California 
 
 34. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–10 (1969). 
 35. Id. 
 36. “Once the personal liberty is shown, the countervailing interest must either be self-
evident or be affirmatively shown.  We see no inherent reason why decency, decorum, or 
good conduct requires a boy to wear his hair short.”  Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286; but see 
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding that long hair might affect 
sanitation of the pool or distract others from strong academic performance). 
 37. See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 38. See Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286. 
 39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507–08.  
 40. See Richards, 424 F.2d at 1285. 
 41. Id. at 1285. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Rather than attacking individual aspects of dress codes, following this string of 
1970s cases (and their overall lack of success in challenging these provisions), plaintiffs 
have instead attacked public school uniform requirements, which became popular in the 
early 21
st
 Century.  See infra note 57. 
 44. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a). 
 45. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a)(1). 
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Education Code allows for schools to institute dress codes and even 
uniform policies to prevent gang-related apparel from disrupting the 
school environment.
46
  Similarly, schools may prohibit clothing that 
can conceal, or even be used as, weapons in order to protect the safety 
of everyone on the school campus.
47
  In areas where gang affiliation is 
a concern, clothing becomes an issue to the extent that it indicates 
gang-related association or threats, distracting students from school and 
instead diverting their attention to their own personal safety.
48
 
Individual rights, such as free expression, that are not subject to a 
specified heightened scrutiny are reviewed by courts under the rational 
basis test.
49
  Under this test, any conceivable and legitimate 
government interest will suffice to justify the governmental regulation 
at issue, so long as they are rationally related to the means utilized.
50
 
This almost certainly ensures that the government will overcome any 
challenge.
51
  There is precedent for finding that dress codes may be 
arbitrary, overbroad, or unrelated to the educational mission so as to be 
found invalid.
52
  A length requirement for girls’ shorts, for example, is 
an arbitrary choice of four inches above the knee.
53
  Preventing 
garments from being too short does further the valid purpose of 
preventing indecency, but four inches is an arbitrary length; four inches 
above the knee looks different on a girl who is five feet tall versus a 
girl who is nearly six feet tall.
54
  To that end, a court may find the 
provision to be arbitrary and therefore invalid and unenforceable, as 
was done by the Arkansas court in Wallace v. Ford.
55
  Similarly, the 
defendant school must show that there is a rational relationship 
between any type of banned clothing and furthering its educational 
mission, which cannot be found if the rule is arbitrary.
56
 
More recently, there has been a renewed interest in free 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a)(2)–(4) 
 48. Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a)(5)–(6) 
 49. The liberty interest here of dressing as one chooses, because it has not been 
specifically addressed by the Supreme Court, is not a fundamental right subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
 50. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938). 
 51. If the government can give a conceivable rationale of a legitimate use of legislative 
or executive power in enacting a law or rule which may consequently infringe on some 
rights, the court will allow the law or rule to stand as a show of respect for the political 
branches and preserving the separation of powers.  
 52. See Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1972). 
 53. Id. at 163–64. See infra Part IV. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 164.  Dress code provisions that are “arbitrary” do not satisfy the 
constitutional requirement that any rule that infringes on students’ rights must be rationally 
related to the legitimate goal of the school. 
 56. Id. 
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expression claims in dress codes due to a trend toward mandatory 
uniforms for public schools.
57
  The Ninth Circuit addressed a 
mandatory uniform in a Nevada public school as having the potential to 
invade First Amendment rights, though found that the particular dress 
code in that case did not infringe on constitutionally protected rights.
58
  
Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Jacobs v. Clark County School 
District, speech rights in public schools fall into one of three 
categories: “(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech, 
(2) school-sponsored speech, and (3) speech that falls into neither of 
these categories.”59  Dress codes fall into neither of the first two 
categories.
60
  The third category of all other types of speech, according 
to the Ninth Circuit, is to be viewed with “Tinker scrutiny.”61  The 
Supreme Court, however, limited Tinker’s test of “substantial 
interference” to “pure speech” that conveys a particularized message.62  
The Ninth Circuit has confirmed Tinker’s limitations.63  Because 
Tinker cannot be applied to all speech rights outside offensive speech 
and school-sponsored speech, the Ninth Circuit has utilized a different 
approach.
64
 
Content- and viewpoint-neutral dress codes that have an incidental 
impact on students’ rights of free expression must survive intermediate 
scrutiny in order to be found constitutional.
65
  A law or regulation is 
content-neutral if it does not limit speech based on particular subject-
matters.
66
  Viewpoint-neutrality is satisfied when the regulation does 
not differentiate based on various opinions within a certain subject-
matter.
67
   
Intermediate scrutiny in First Amendment claims have a specific 
 
 57. E.g., Tamar Lewin, Dress for Success: Public School Uniforms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
25, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/25/us/dress-for-success-public-school-
uniforms.html.  
 58. Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 426, 437–38 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that mandatory uniform policies do not infringe on students’ constitutionally protected right 
to “expressive conduct”) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. at 429 (quoting Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–08, 511 (1969) 
(stating that the Court’s holding does not pertain to “the length of skirts or type of clothing, 
to hair style or deportment”). 
 63. King v. Saddleback Jr. Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that 
the regulation for hair length was not intended to curtail speech rights, and the students in 
violation did not have any intention of using their hair as a symbol for any kind of speech). 
 64. Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S, 622, 643 (1994). 
 67. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988). 
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test.
68
  The law subject to this level of scrutiny will be upheld as 
constitutional if: (1) “it furthers an important or substantial government 
interest”; (2) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression”; and (3) “the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest.”69  The first prong of this test has two parts, namely 
that the government interest must be important or substantial, and the 
rule furthers that interest.
70
  The test as described by the Supreme Court 
and applied to school dress codes by the Ninth Circuit is silent on how 
close the relationship between the school’s rule and its purpose must be 
in this context.  The governmental interest must be unrelated to 
suppressing free expression and the suppression that does occur must 
be as minimal as possible.
71
  The nature of dress codes inherently does 
suppress expression in and of itself, but courts have found that a 
regulation is permissible if the government entity’s stated intention is 
not directed at speech or expression.
72
  The Ninth Circuit found that the 
uniform policy only limited one form of student expression while 
keeping open many other channels for expression.
73
 
In summation, the Ninth Circuit currently uses intermediate 
scrutiny for content- and viewpoint-neutral laws that infringe upon free 
expression.
74
 The three-prong test requires that the rule further an 
important government interest, has a purpose unrelated to suppressing 
expression, and is the most minimally oppressive alternative available 
to further the government’s interest.75  Content-based or viewpoint-
based rules for appearance and dress are evaluated using the Tinker 
test.
76
  As of yet, however, courts have not examined the most recent 
dress code issues, dealing with “school dress codes only target[ing] 
girls.”77 
B.  Gender Discrimination 
California courts treat gender discrimination differently than those 
at the federal level.  These differences in development and treatment 
 
 68. Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434.  
 69. Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 661–62). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. See id. at 434–35.  
 73. Id. at 437.  
 74. See generally Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 75. Id. at 434.  
 76. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 77. Lilian Min, This school just punished at least 25 girls (and zero boys) for dress 
code violations during a massive heatwave, HELLO GIGGLES, June 17, 2015, 
http://hellogiggles.com/only-girls-punished-dress-code.  
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will be discussed separately below, first at the California state level, 
followed by the federal level. 
1. California Equal Protection 
The California Constitution states that “a person may not be . . . 
denied equal protection of the laws.”78  Under equal protection law, 
some discrimination is permitted for effective legislation and 
enforcement of laws, but certain categories are protected more 
stringently than others.
79
  The highest level of protection is given to 
those within suspect classes.
80
  In California, gender has been treated as 
a suspect class since 1971.
81
 
In Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, bar owners sought a writ of mandate 
to prevent the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control from 
revoking their licenses because they had hired female bartenders.
82
 The 
department at that time could have acceptably revoked such licenses 
because the Business and Professions Code included a provision that 
prohibited women from being bartenders, unless they were wives or 
direct family members of the holder of the liquor license.
83
  This rule 
was challenged as a violation of the equal protection of the law as 
guaranteed in the California Constitution.
84
 The California Supreme 
Court invalidated the rule
85
 and established sex as a suspect class under 
California law, subjecting all laws making distinctions based on gender 
to strict scrutiny.
86
  The court found that sex is an immutable trait that 
“frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to 
society,” similar to race or lineage.87  Women were traditionally 
prohibited from full participation in American society as a protective 
measure, resulting from outdated stereotypes about women and their 
“proper” role.88  Gender is therefore treated as a suspect class in 
California to prevent the continued use of sexual stereotypes in 
 
 78. Cal. Const. art. I § 7.  
 79. Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1971). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 17. 
 82. Id. at 6. 
 83. Id. (citing Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 25656).  
 84. Id. at 15. The relevant sections of the California Constitution at the time the case 
was decided was art. I §§ 11, 21 but these numbers have since changed. 
 85. Petitioners in this case also challenged on the basis of a different section of the 
California Constitution (Cal. Const. art. XX § 18 (since renumbered to Cal. Const. art. I § 
8)) as well as under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution. Sail'er Inn, 5 Cal. 3d at 6 (1971). 
 86. Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18 (1971). 
 87. Id. Immutable characteristics such as these are typically treated as suspect classes.  
 88. Id.  
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invidious practices.
89
  California public policy thus mandates equal 
treatment of men and women.
90
 
Because gender is a suspect class in California, laws that make 
distinctions based on gender are subject to strict scrutiny.
91
  Under this 
level of review, such laws may be upheld only if they are shown to be 
necessary to further a compelling state interest, using the least 
restrictive means available.
92
  The challenger always bears the burden 
of showing unconstitutionality but pointing out express gender 
classifications within a statutory scheme meets this burden in 
California.
93
  Essentially, when gender classifications are unnecessary 
and gender-neutral alternatives are available, the law in question is 
unconstitutional.
94
 
Equal protection jurisprudence differentiates between facially 
neutral and facially discriminatory classifications.
95
  Facially 
discriminatory classifications involve blatant disparate treatment 
between men and women on the face of the government rule, while 
facially neutral rules are silent on their classification but have a 
disparate impact one gender over the other.
96
 
For facially discriminatory laws, the key consideration for the 
court is whether the gender distinctions are necessary to further a 
compelling state interest and whether gender-neutral alternatives are 
available.
97
  The school rule must also be necessary to further the 
compelling interest; the means to the ends must be narrowly tailored.
98
  
Strict scrutiny also requires that no gender-neutral alternatives are 
available.
99
  No law that makes direct gender distinctions can survive if 
gender-neutral alternatives are available and not implemented in place 
of the gender-conscious distinction.
100
 
Strict scrutiny is only automatically applied when, as previously 
stated, the rule differentiates between the sexes on its face.
101
  In order 
to show gender discrimination through a neutral law, the plaintiff must 
also show that the law was created with a discriminatory intent; 
 
 89. Id. at 18–20. 
 90. Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 37 (1985). 
 91. See id.; See also Sail’er Inn, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20.  
 92. Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658, 674 (2008) (citing Connerly v. State Pers. 
Bd., 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 33 (2001)).   
 93. Id. 
 94. Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 674.  
 95. See Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1 (1978).  
 96. Id.  
 97. See Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 674.  
 98. Id. at 674–75.  
 99. Id. (citing Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 36 (2001)). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Hardy, 21 Cal. 3d 1 at 7. 
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discriminatory effect is not enough to elicit strict scrutiny.
102
  
Discriminatory intent is shown through the state selecting a course of 
action because of the adverse effects it will create on a particular 
group, not simply in spite of these effect.
103
  This intent element is 
subjective—in that the state must have purposefully intended for the 
law to discriminate—rather than objective—wherein the state’s actions, 
by their nature, would lead to a discriminatory effect.
104
  Without 
discriminatory intent, discrimination based on gender cannot be 
found.
105
  Without such purposeful discrimination against a suspect 
class, the court cannot utilize strict scrutiny against the law.
106
  Instead, 
the court will apply the rational basis test.  In such a case, the state 
action must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental purpose in order to be found constitutional.
107
 
2. Federal Equal Protection 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”108  Just as under the California 
Constitution, federal jurisprudence reviews any law burdening a 
suspect class under strict scrutiny.
109
  But unlike in California, gender 
is not a suspect class under federal law and therefore does not receive 
strict scrutiny.
110
  In 1976, the Supreme Court developed a new level of 
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren.
111
 Based on previous cases that invalidated 
gender discrimination, the Court evaluated an Oklahoma law using 
what would be termed intermediate scrutiny.
112
  The law allowed 
women to purchase low alcohol content beer at age eighteen, but 
required men to be twenty-one for such a purchase.
113
  The Court found 
that the Equal Protection Clause requires that “classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”114  The 
Oklahoma law did not meet this level of scrutiny and was found 
 
 102. See Baluyut v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 826, 837 (1996).  
 103. Id. at 36–37 (citing  Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985)). 
 104. See id. at 37. 
 105. See Hardy, 21 Cal. 3d at 7.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.  
 109. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 110. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 192.  
 114. Id.at 197.  
2017] DRESSING TO IMPRESS? 271 
unconstitutional.
115
 
For gender classifications, the Supreme Court has been adamant 
about what governmental objectives will be found sufficiently 
important to survive intermediate scrutiny.
116
 Most recently, the Court 
has expressed these considerations in United States v. Virginia, 
wherein the Virginia Military Institute was found in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when it refused admission to women.
117
  The 
Court articulated that the governmental body defending such a gender-
based classification must demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification.”118  Such a justification must be demonstrably genuine 
and not merely created as a response to litigation.
119
  Overbroad 
generalizations about differences between males and females relating 
to their talents, capacities or preferences are impermissible.
120
 Utilizing 
sex as a proxy for furthering “traditional” gender roles that bear no 
relation to desired qualities would be found similarly lacking as an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”121  The Supreme Court 
jurisprudence requires that the justification for such a classification be 
genuine and not merely concocted in response to an equal protection 
challenge against it.
122
  Virginia Military Institute’s objectives in 
refusing to admit women were not backed by the required “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” and the school was ordered to allow admission 
to women.
123
 
Once a court does find an important purpose or “exceedingly 
persuasive justification,” the court then looks to find a substantial 
relationship between the gender classification and the important 
purpose.
124
  This substantial relationship is very fact-specific, and the 
Supreme Court has found that a gender-related classification does not 
require that the rule under consideration must, in every instance, be 
capable of achieving its ultimate objective.
125
  To require such a strong 
relationship would entail a higher level of review than intermediate 
scrutiny.  Cases have been decided both ways on whether such a 
substantial relationship exists between the means and ends in gender 
 
 115. Id. at 210.  
 116. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
 117. Id. at 558.  
 118. Id. at 531.  
 119. Id. at 533.  
 120. Id.  
 121. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976); see also United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. at 534.  
 122. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.  
 123. Id. at 534.  
 124. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.  
 125. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001).  
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discrimination cases.
126
 
Just as in California, federal equal protection differentiates 
between facially neutral and facially discriminatory laws.
127
 In order 
for a gender-neutral law to receive intermediate scrutiny for gender-
based discrimination, the Supreme Court has laid out a two-part test.
128
  
First, the classification in question must be truly neutral and not 
gender-based in a covert manner.
129
  If not, the court looks to find a 
discriminatory purpose behind the gender-neutral law.
130
  Only 
disparate impact as a result of invidious gender discrimination will 
suffice to receive intermediate scrutiny.
131
 In that second inquiry, the 
evidence of disparate impact is a starting point, but must be the result 
of purposeful discrimination in order to be found unconstitutional.
132
  
Such purposeful discrimination must be proved, just as under 
California law.
133
  The California courts borrowed analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to equal protection under the 
California Constitution.
134
  As such, the same intent element is required 
under federal law, wherein the subjective intent of the governmental 
body in enacting the gender-neutral provision was to unequally burden 
one gender.
135
  Without proof of intentional invidious discrimination, 
courts will not invalidate a law, neutral on its face and serving 
otherwise legitimate ends, that happens to have a greater effect on one 
group than on another.
136
 
 
 126. See generally Nguyen 533 U.S. at 73 (finding a substantial relationship between 
stricter requirements for proving paternity than for maternity and the government’s goal of 
preventing fraud in naturalization claims); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 
(1976); (finding a substantial relationship lacking between the important purpose of 
preventing drunk driving and imposing separate age requirements for men and women 
purchasing alcohol). 
 127. See supra Parts I.B.1–2.  
 128. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).  
 129. Id. In this case, the State of Massachusetts gave preferential hiring in government 
jobs to veterans.  This practice had the effect of denying Ms. Feeney from government 
positions and promotions, as women were denied opportunities in the armed forces until 
very recently.  The classification was one of veterans versus non-veterans, but because 
nearly all veterans were men at that time, women were effectively excluded from this 
favored group.  The Court found, however, that because men were in both categories of 
veterans and non-veterans, the classification was not covertly gender-based. 
 130. Id. at 274.  
 131. See id. at 278–80.  
 132. Id. at 274.  
 133. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 134. Baluyut v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 826, 837 (1996) (citing Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
 135. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
 136. Id.  
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II.  ISSUE 
Gender discrimination in public school dress codes is a two-tiered 
issue: essentially, free expression rights for students to choose their 
clothing are burdened more heavily for girls than for boys; the free 
expression issue is embedded within a gender discrimination issue.  
This duality of constitutional concerns is denied full review on the 
merits due to current jurisprudence.  Both in California and at the 
federal level, absent a facially discriminatory law, a plaintiff must 
prove purposeful discrimination in order to receive any kind of 
heightened scrutiny.
137
  Showing proof of purposeful discrimination is 
a very high bar to meet, and plaintiffs rarely, if ever, succeed in 
showing that a neutral law is promulgated with discriminatory intent.
138
  
When this discriminatory intent, even if it does exist, cannot be shown, 
the plaintiff cannot receive heightened scrutiny, and a court will not 
reach the proper merits of the discrimination claim.  For girls receiving 
dress code violations at a higher rate than boys, this means that their 
discrimination claim will receive only rational basis review, wherein 
the court will almost certainly find in favor of the school.  The only 
other alternative is to challenge the dress code purely on freedom of 
expression grounds under the First Amendment,
139
 even though the real 
issue is that it is girls whose free expression rights are being unduly 
restricted, while boys are not likewise burdened.  Additionally, schools 
today rarely create dress codes that would violate free expression on 
their face, due to over four decades of state and federal litigation on the 
subject.
140
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
To illustrate this issue, let us consider this fact pattern: 
Emma is a fourteen-year-old freshman at a California public high 
school.  On a hot day, she decided to wear a pair of shorts and a tank 
top to school.  The shorts reached down to her mid-thigh and the straps 
on her tank top sufficiently covered her undergarments, cleavage, and 
midriff, exposing only her shoulders and her neck.  She went through 
the morning at school without comment from any of her friends or 
teachers in regards to her appearance.  At lunchtime, however, she 
walked across the quad and was stopped by Vice Principal Smith, who 
told Emma to accompany her to the administrative office.  On their 
 
 137. See supra Parts I.B.1. –2. 
 138. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241–42; see also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 276–79 (1979); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987). 
 139. See supra Part I.A.  
 140. See supra Parts I.A. & I.B.1. 
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way, they walked by a group of boys wearing shorts and tank tops who 
complained about the heat.  In the office, Vice Principal Smith took a 
ruler and put it beside Emma’s knees.  She informed Emma that her 
shorts were five inches above her knees, rather than the acceptable four 
inches, and her tank top was a prohibited item in the dress code.  She 
would have to wait in the office for her parents to bring her a change of 
clothes before she would be allowed to go back to class.  Emma ended 
up missing a math quiz while she was waiting, and was unable to make 
it up due to missing class for disciplinary reasons.  Emma left that day 
feeling embarrassed at being told to change, annoyed for being singled 
out when boys were wearing similar clothing, and worried about her 
math grade.  Emma’s mother came to talk to Vice Principal Smith 
about the incident and was told that the dress code is a way of 
preventing disruption and distraction in school and keeping students 
focused on education rather than what others are wearing.  Emma’s 
mother was given a copy of the school’s dress code policy,141 which 
shows that Emma was in violation.  Emma and her parents feel that this 
is a violation of her rights and wish to challenge it. 
The remainder of this section will go through an analysis of this 
fictitious case using current state and federal law on the issue.
142
  As 
described above, current laws do not allow for a case such as Emma’s 
to have a chance of prevailing. 
 
 141. The dress code of Emma’s high school is as follows: 
(1)   Clothes, apparel or attire must be sufficient to conceal undergarments at all times. 
Clothing, apparel or attire that fails to provide adequate coverage of the body, 
including but not limited to, see-through or fishnet fabrics, bare midriffs, tank 
tops, spaghetti strap tops, off-the-shoulder or low-cut tops are prohibited.  
(2)   Clothing, grooming, accessories, and jewelry shall be free of writing, pictures, 
symbols or any other insignia which are crude, vulgar, profane, obscene, libelous, 
slanderous, or sexually suggestive. Clothing, grooming, accessories or jewelry 
that degrade any cultural, religious or ethnic values or which advocate racial, 
ethnic, or religious prejudice or discrimination, or which promote gang-affiliation, 
sex, the use of tobacco, drugs, or alcohol or any unlawful acts, are prohibited. 
(3)   Female-specific prohibited items include: tube tops, low-cut tops that expose 
cleavage, tops that expose most or all of the back (such as halter tops), skirts or 
shorts which are shorter than four inches above the knee (even when walking), 
and yoga pants or leggings worn without an outer garment that does not reach 
four inches above the knee. 
(4)   Male-specific prohibited items include: sagging pants, and bandanas 
Modified based on the dress code of Foothill High School in Pleasanton, CA, found at: 
http://www.foothillfalcons.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=45194&type=d&pREC_ID
=57384; 
and the dress code of Vista Murrieta High School in Murrieta, CA, found at: 
http://www.murrieta.k12.ca.us/cms/lib5/CA01000508/Centricity/Domain/1685/Student%20
Handbook%2015-16-Editable.pdf.  
 142. See infra Part III. 
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A.  Free Expression 
Current law regarding to free expression claims against public 
school dress codes are subject to intermediate scrutiny.
143
  Here, 
Emma’s claim could potentially succeed in proving the dress code 
provisions cannot survive intermediate scrutiny.  The stated intention 
of the school in promulgating the dress code is to “prevent distraction 
and disruption of its students.”144  Given the rampant potential for 
distraction in public schools, this goal is certainly an important one; 
schools have a duty to educate students, and disruption frustrates this 
purpose.  The problem the school faces here is in the second part of this 
first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test: the dress code must further 
the school’s interest.  The test as described by the Supreme Court and 
applied to school dress codes by the Ninth Circuit is silent on how 
close the relationship between the rule and the purpose must be in this 
context.
145
  A court could take a very loose approach and find that 
because a dress code could conceivably serve to prevent distraction and 
disruption in school, this prong of the test is satisfied.  But a court 
could just as realistically require a closer relationship.  In that instance, 
the school would need to show that tank tops—on both boys and 
girls—and girls’ shorts shorter than four inches above the knee are in 
fact distracting or disruptive to the educational process.  Barring visible 
undergarments or inappropriate parts of the body showing, those items 
of clothing are not distracting.
146
  If the school cannot show that the 
dress code, as applied to Emma, in fact does further the school’s goals, 
the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny test must fail. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a court hearing Emma’s claim chose to 
apply a looser interpretation and finds the first prong satisfied, the court 
would then move on to the second and third prongs.  The governmental 
interest must be unrelated to suppressing free expression, and the 
suppression that does occur must be as minimal as possible.
147
  The 
school’s stated intention in this case is preventing distraction and 
disruption, which on its face is unrelated to prohibiting expression.  
The nature of dress codes inherently does suppress expression in and of 
itself, but courts have found that a regulation is permissible if the 
 
 143. See Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 434–35 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 144. See infra Part III.  
 145. See Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 
622, 661–62 (1994). 
 146. If a fourteen-year-old girl’s shoulders are in fact distracting to education—
especially when boys wearing clothing that exposes their shoulders is not found to be 
equally distracting, despite the gender-neutral ban on tank tops—then this bespeaks a far 
greater problem than just the First Amendment implications of this dress code. 
 147. See Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 434–35.  
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government entity’s stated intention is not directed at speech or 
expression.
148
  A court in this case would likely find the intention of 
Emma’s school to be permissible. 
As for the third prong, requiring, essentially, for no less onerous 
alternatives to the suppression of expression, the issue is much closer.  
In a case regarding a free expression challenge to a mandatory uniform 
policy, the Ninth Circuit found that the uniform policy only limited one 
form of student expression, while keeping open many other channels 
for expression.
149
  A court in this case could apply the same rationale 
and find that, because the dress code at Emma’s school is less limiting 
than a mandatory uniform, there is far less suppression of expression.  
Alternatively, because Emma’s school has decided against a uniform 
policy and has instead carved out exceptions and complex rules 
regarding dress, it has created a more onerous alternative than a full 
uniform.  This is due to the arguably arbitrary nature of the rules 
promulgated as well as their selective enforcement.
150
  Overly complex 
rules can do more harm than simple, sweeping ones.
151
  In choosing to 
institute a uniform policy, the school would probably have more 
success in furthering its objectives, rather than a complicated set of 
provisions left open to interpretation by the students who are subject to 
them and the school staff enforcing them.  When applied as they were 
against Emma, enforcing these rules causes more distraction and 
disruption than they perhaps prevent.  If a court accepts this reasoning, 
the third prong of the intermediate scrutiny test has failed.  This 
argument, however, is something of a stretch.  A court would more 
than likely find the dress code at Emma’s school to be a valid, 
constitutionally permissible exercise of school authority, upholding this 
and other dress codes around the country. 
B.  Gender Discrimination 
Gender discrimination is the main thrust of this paper’s interest, 
and the main problem with the current state of the law.  Here, Emma 
has two separate but related equal protection claims under both 
California and federal law. 
 
 148. Id. at 436. 
 149. See Jacobs. 
 150. According to Section 1 of the dress code, tank tops are prohibited as ‘overly 
revealing’ clothing, a rule that applies equally to both boys and girls.  Yet boys wearing tank 
tops were ignored as Emma was disciplined for her tank top.  Additionally, Sections 3 and 4 
of the dress code are directed specifically to girls and to boys, respectively.  The gender 
disparity is discussed below. 
 151. See, e.g. Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Ark. 1972).  
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1. California Equal Protection 
Emma’s first claim is the ban on tank tops in Section 1152 of the 
dress code as applied to Emma and not to the boys wearing tank tops 
against whom the dress code was not enforced.  The second is the 
female-only ban on shorts shorter than four inches above the knee 
stated in Section 3 of the dress code.
153
  Emma would argue that the 
former is a gender-neutral rule with a disparate impact on girls, while 
the second is a facially discriminatory provision that cannot survive 
strict scrutiny. 
The facially discriminatory provision will be discussed first, as it 
would have the greatest likelihood of success.  Section 3 of the dress 
code lists a specific list of clothing items that are prohibited for female 
students.
154
 Section 4 has a far shorter list of items that are prohibited 
for male students.
155
  While the school will surely argue that these 
differences were made out of practicality—boys wearing the female-
prohibited items are not a problem, and vice versa—under California 
law, this is somewhat irrelevant.  The key consideration for the court is 
whether the gender distinctions are necessary to further a compelling 
state interest, and whether gender-neutral alternatives are available.
156
  
Sections 3 and 4 of the school dress code likely would not survive this 
strict scrutiny test. 
First, while the school’s stated purpose of preventing distraction 
and disruption is arguably compelling,
157
  the school likely would not 
be able to show that Sections 3 and 4, as written, are necessary in 
furthering this purpose.  The way the gender-conscious provisions are 
written, a girl wearing a bandana or a boy wearing a tube top, for 
example, would not be in violation of the dress code.  If the bandana 
prohibition for males is in relation to the gang-related safety concerns 
addressed in Section 2 of the dress code,
158
 then the harm of girls 
 
 152. See supra note 142.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658, 674 (2008). 
 157. This purpose was found to be important/substantial in the Ninth Circuit federal 
court when school dress codes were examined under federal free expression intermediate 
scrutiny, as discussed above, supra Part III.A, but California courts have not yet examined 
school dress codes using strict scrutiny for gender discrimination.  Until a California court 
has determined what compelling purposes are under California law, the disposition for such 
a claim is unclear.  Due to lack of California jurisprudence on the matter, this paper fills in 
gaps using federal precedent on the issue.  Federal courts have not refuted schools for 
having a stated purpose of preventing distraction and disruption in school.  (See generally 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). 
 158. A provision banning bandanas due to safety concerns with gangs is a common and 
permissible exercise of school authority in promulgating a dress code.  Safety concerns such 
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wearing bandanas as a showing of gang affiliation would be just as 
harmful as boys doing so.  As for the regulation on length of shorts for 
girls, while it may be more common for girls to wear shorter shorts 
than boys, shorts shorter than four inches above the knee made for 
males are not unheard of.
159
  Just as with the bandana provision, if a 
male student were to wear shorts shorter than four inches above his 
knees, he would not be found in violation of the dress code as Emma 
was for her shorts.  These examples show that the gender discrepancies 
in the banned items of clothing in Sections 3 and 4 are not necessary in 
preventing distraction and disruption in school.  In order to be 
necessary to further a compelling interest, the means to that end must 
be narrowly tailored.
160
  If these provisions were narrowly tailored, the 
interests of the school should still be furthered, or at least not at issue, 
when the provisions are applied cross-gender. 
Additionally, strict scrutiny requires that no gender-neutral 
alternatives are available.
161
 No law that makes direct gender 
distinctions can survive if gender-neutral alternatives are available and 
not implemented in place of the gender-conscious distinction.
162
 As 
pointed out above, the gender-based prohibitions of clothing would 
likely not be found necessary to accomplish the intent of Emma’s 
school.  The same goals can be attained by eliminating the gender 
distinctions altogether.  This is an alternative available to the school, 
and it creates a gender-neutral rule.  Because this alternative is 
available and was not utilized by the school, Sections 3 and 4 of the 
dress code would likely be found to fail the strict scrutiny test in 
California courts. 
Emma’s other equal protection claim is much trickier.  Strict 
scrutiny is only automatically applied when, as in the previous section, 
the rule differentiates between the sexes on its face.
163
  Section 1 of the 
dress code at Emma’s school is a gender neutral provision, prohibiting 
tank tops worn by any student, regardless of gender.
164
  As applied, 
according to the facts above and more than likely based on evidence 
 
as these also create distraction and disruption, so the safety provisions also contribute to the 
goal of preventing such distraction and disruption. See Cal. Educ. Code § 35183(a). 
 159. Shorter shorts on men are currently in fashion and sold at stores popular with boys 
of high school age.  See, for example, these popular shorts sold by Chubbies: 
https://www.chubbiesshorts.com/. 
 160. Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 674–75.  
 161. Id. at 674. 
 162. Woods, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 675 (citing Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 92 Cal. App. 
4th 16, 36 (2001)). 
 163. Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1, 7 (1978).  
 164. See supra note 142. 
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collected in discovery,
165
 girls receive disciplinary action as a result of 
wearing tank tops far more often than boys, despite both genders 
wearing tank tops in violation of the dress code.  This serves to show a 
disparate impact, unequally burdening girls.
166
  In order to succeed in 
an equal protection claim, Emma would need to show that this gender-
neutral provision was enacted with an intent to discriminate against 
girls.
167
 
In Emma’s case, it is highly unlikely that such a discriminatory 
intent could be shown.  The gender-neutral tank top ban, like the rest of 
the dress code, was created to prevent distraction and disruption to the 
educational process.  Such an intent is unrelated to any gender 
differences.  The only way there could be a discriminatory intent would 
be if, in deciding to include tank tops in clothing that “fails to provide 
adequate coverage of the body,”168 the school knew that only girls 
wearing tank tops would fall under this description and intended to 
only enforce this provision against girls.  Failing this, as one likely 
would, one cannot sufficiently prove discriminatory intent. 
If Emma cannot show that the school intended to discriminate 
with the tank top ban in Section 1 of the dress code, the court will not 
apply strict scrutiny to her claim. This is because without 
discriminatory intent, discrimination based on gender cannot be 
found.
169
  Without such purposeful discrimination against a suspect 
class, the court cannot utilize strict scrutiny against the law.
170
  Instead, 
the court will apply the rational basis test,
171
 and Emma realistically 
cannot win her challenge to the dress code.  The school’s goal of 
preventing distraction and disruption is certainly a legitimate state 
 
 165. Schools, typically keep disciplinary records of students, and a survey of such 
records would more than likely turn up evidence that the tank top ban yields disciplinary 
action against girls far more often than boys.  And by talking to students and teachers and 
others at the school, evidence could be gathered to show that boys as well as girls wear tank 
tops—therein showing that girls are not the only ones who wear them and therefore are the 
only ones disciplined for doing so.  In short, it would not be a stretch to assume that this 
policy at this and many other schools is enforced overwhelmingly against girls, creating the 
disparate impact complained of here. 
 166. This would be consistent with news stories and studies at high schools across the 
country.  For example, in a 2014 survey conducted at Menlo-Atherton High School in 
California, 64% of the 118 girls interviewed had been given some sort of disciplinary 
warning about their appearance violating the dress code, compared with only 12% of the 
111 boys interviewed.  http://www.mabearnews.org/news/2014/01/13/feminist-club-
releases-dress-code-survey-feedback-with-alarming-results/ 
 167. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 168. See supra note 142. 
 169. See Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1, 7–8 (1978). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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interest,
172
 and a dress code is a rational way to achieve such a goal. 
Therefore, if Emma cannot show that the tank top ban was enacted 
with the purpose of unequally burdening girls, she will not succeed on 
this claim. 
2. Federal Equal Protection 
If Emma were not in California, which provides stronger 
protection against gender discrimination,
173
 the default position would 
be to use the Fourteenth Amendment and federal equal protection 
jurisprudence.
174
  Just as under California law, Emma has a claim 
against the facially discriminatory provisions in Sections 3 and 4, and a 
claim against the gender neutral provision in Section 1. 
For the claim against the facially discriminatory provisions, the 
first consideration is the school’s purpose.175  While the dress code was 
viewed as a whole under intermediate scrutiny with regards to free 
expression, equal protection claims require not just that the purpose of 
the dress code be important, but that the justification for utilizing a sex-
based classification be important as well.
176
  Here, the school’s purpose 
in enacting the dress code was to prevent distraction and disruption to 
the educational process.  As discussed above, a court would almost 
certainly find this to be an important purpose.
177
  But this purpose does 
not describe the specific use of gender-based distinctions for banned 
clothing items in Sections 3 and 4.  The Supreme Court jurisprudence 
requires that the justification for such a classification be genuine and 
not merely concocted in response to an equal protection challenge 
against it.
178
  Therefore, Emma’s school must have evidence of the 
need for such sex-based clothing prohibitions when the dress code was 
promulgated, an issue that would be explored during discovery in the 
litigation process. 
A court would then have to determine if this is an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for such a classification.179  Emma would 
argue that the school’s purpose does not meet this standard.  An 
assumption that boys and girls wear different types of clothing is an 
 
 172. If such a goal would be found to be important or substantial under intermediate 
scrutiny, a higher level to meet, it will definitely found to be a legitimate state interest under 
rational basis. See King v. Saddleback Junior Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 939–40 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
 173. See Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16–17 (1971); See supra Part I.B.1. 
 174. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1; Supra Part I.B.2. 
 175. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 176. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); See supra Part I.B.2. 
 177. See King, 445 F.2d at 939–40. 
 178. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 179. Id. at 531. 
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assumption based on the preferences of males and females.  It also is 
becoming an outdated view of youth culture in the United States.
180
  
Because perceived preferences between the sexes do not constitute an 
‘important’ purpose for a gender-based classification or an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification,”181 the school’s purpose here 
fails to meet its required threshold under intermediate scrutiny.  
Additionally, this purpose is based not only on preferences, but it seeks 
to perpetuate traditional gender roles and stereotypes, which is 
similarly unacceptable.
182
  The exact length specification is an arbitrary 
requirement designed to impose traditional ideas of modesty onto 
young girls.
183
  This preservation of gender roles that impose 
patriarchal protectionist views of girls is unacceptable under 
intermediate scrutiny, as it fails to be an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification.”184  Therefore, if the court accepts this line of argument, 
the school would not meet its burden of having an important 
governmental interest in imposing a gender-based classification. 
Realistically, a court could very well find that the school’s 
purpose was sufficiently important, so the next consideration would be 
the fit between the means and ends of the dress code.
185
  In this case, 
assuming that boys and girls wearing different clothing and thereby 
prohibiting different items of clothing for each is an important 
justification, the relationship between the gender classification and the 
school’s goal would likely be sufficiently substantial, and Sections 3 
and 4 would be upheld under intermediate scrutiny, defeating Emma’s 
claim. 
Emma’s second equal protection claim is against the gender-
neutral ban on tank tops.  Just as under California law, Emma would 
first have to show that the tank top ban is, at its root, a gender-based 
 
 180. Emerging issues regarding gender fluidity and transgender individuals are beyond 
the scope of this paper and will therefore not be discussed at length.  These changes in 
gender roles and gender norms, as well as the very idea of gender itself, are very much real 
in American society today.  Such concepts are also more prevalent in younger people, many 
of whom are students at public schools.   
 181. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 182. Id. at 533–34. 
 183. Even back in the 1970s, when traditional gender roles were still in full force, one 
district court found a length requirement for skirts to be arbitrary because a certain number 
of inches in length look different on a girl who is five feet tall versus a girl who is nearly six 
feet tall.  Even if preserving female modesty was an acceptably ‘important’ goal for the 
school to have, a requisite length for skirts was not an effective way to accomplish it.  See 
Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 164 (1972). 
 184. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976); see also United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. at 534. 
 185. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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provision.
186
  If an intent to apply this provision only to female students 
can be found, a court can find that this gender-neutral provision is in 
fact gender-biased, thereby receiving intermediate scrutiny just as any 
facial classification based on gender would receive.
187
  If Emma fails to 
show that the gender-neutral provision is overtly gender-based, she 
must instead show purposeful discrimination.
188
  Without proof of 
intentional invidious discrimination, courts will not invalidate a law, 
neutral on its face and serving otherwise legitimate ends, that happens 
to have a greater effect on one group than on another.
189
  Just as under 
California equal protection, it is unlikely that Emma could prevail 
here.
190
  Intent to discriminate likely cannot be sufficiently proved in 
order for the court to apply intermediate scrutiny.  Without any kind of 
heightened scrutiny, a court would not be able to fully examine the full 
picture of a claim such as this, leaving Emma and plaintiffs like her 
with no chance at having a valid challenge, let alone winning a case 
like this and seeking a fair remedy. 
IV.  PROPOSAL 
Because a case such as Emma’s cannot, under current state and 
federal law, even pass the threshold of any heightened scrutiny, courts 
should take a different approach for gender discrimination in regards to 
public school dress codes.  Rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove 
discriminatory intent, courts should employ a burden-shifting 
rebuttable presumption.  Using this method, a plaintiff would need to 
show only the disparate impact of dress code provisions that unequally 
burden girls in order to have a court apply the requisite heightened 
scrutiny.  The defendant school would be able to overcome the 
presumption of gender-based action through contrary evidence in 
defense of its dress codes; not every instance of a dress code violation 
is direct evidence of gender discrimination.  This way, the plaintiffs 
can present their full case for discrimination and unduly burdened 
rights of free expression in a manner more equitable than is currently 
available. 
To illustrate how this presumption would function in practice, let 
us return to Emma’s discrimination claims.  Under California law, 
Emma would need to present evidence showing that the tank top ban in 
Section 1 of her dress code
191
 is enforced against female students and 
 
 186. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275–79 (1979). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 190. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 191. See supra note 142. 
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not against male students.  This would satisfy the presumption of 
intent.  From there, the court could go on to apply strict scrutiny.  Even 
though strict scrutiny is often viewed as fatal to any law to which it is 
applied,
192
 the school would still have avenues available to it to defeat a 
plaintiff’s challenge.  Emma’s argument would be that her free 
expression rights are violated by the uneven enforcement of a neutrally 
written dress code provision.
193
  Even if the court does apply strict 
scrutiny to evaluate the gender discrimination, Emma would still need 
to show that her free expression rights were violated.  This is still a 
difficult case to make, and it is unclear how a court would come down 
on this issue until it is actually challenged in practice. 
Under federal law, the same challenges would still apply, even 
with this proposed presumption.  The presumption would allow Emma 
to receive intermediate scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
school may be able to show that its purposes are sufficiently important 
or show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” and that the ban on 
tank tops is substantially related to such a purpose. The school may 
also succeed in showing that despite any disparate treatment between 
the genders, female students like Emma did not actually experience any 
impermissible violation of their free expression rights. 
This presumption does go against settled jurisprudence for equal 
protection cases,
194
 but the unique nature of these dress code claims 
justifies deviation.  The Supreme Court has recognized that 
overlapping constitutional issues may allow for a different treatment.
195
  
Employing the presumption described here would more adequately 
allow these challenges to receive a full review from the courts, rather 
than relegating a complex case such as this to rational basis review, 
where it would more than likely die on impact. 
This presumption, while helpful to reach a heightened level of 
scrutiny, will not guarantee a plaintiff’s victory.  It will, however, 
allow courts to examine the full discrimination claim against schools 
enforcing dress codes unevenly against girls.  The hope, in the end, is 
not to win case after case, but to push for change to dress codes and 
 
 192. See Woods v. Horton, 167 Cal. App. 4th 658 (2008); supra Part I.B.1. 
 193. For the facially discriminatory claim against Sections 3 and 4 of the dress code, 
strict scrutiny would already be applied, precluding a need for the presumption here.  When 
strict scrutiny is applied to these provisions, it would serve to eliminate the gender 
distinctions in the dress code, leaving Emma to fall back to her free expression claim in this 
challenge, as described.  
 194. See supra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 195. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding an unequal burden on interracial 
couples on the fundamental right to marriage); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
882 (1990) (leaving open the possibility of heightened scrutiny for “hybrid” claims of free 
exercise of religion and another constitutional claim). 
284 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:57 
their enforcement.  If schools do not have such an easy time defeating 
challenges to their dress codes, they would be more likely to change 
their practices to avoid costly law suits.  In making litigation more 
difficult through the use of this presumption and encouraging a change 
in school dress codes, the need for the presumption—and indeed, cases 
like this in general—can hopefully be eliminated.  Just as challenges to 
hair length regulations in the 1960s and 1970s have become a thing of 
the past thanks to a change in social norms, this presumption can be a 
tool through which similar change can occur. 
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of public schools is to educate.  Part of that 
educational process involves preparing students for the outside world.  
Stifling expression and individuality, and imposing rigid discipline 
does more harm than good.  Young people will not always have a 
school to look out for them and protect them from things that are 
different or distracting.  It is better to use such distractions as an 
opportunity for growth and tolerance.  This is especially true in the 
case of gender.  The body of a young girl is distracting when it is 
sexualized—visible shoulders or one more inch of bare leg should not 
be viewed as distracting in any way.  By calling Emma’s appearance 
distracting, the school imposes protectionist views on her and 
perpetuates to the rest of the student body that her shoulders and legs 
are distracting and should be viewed as such.   
 It is the sincere hope of this author that more progressive views of 
equality and tolerance take hold in the federal and California courts, 
paving the way for the elimination of antiquated and sexist views of 
female students.  School is a place to grow and learn, and students 
should not be penalized because of the way society has historically 
chosen to treat the clothing they choose to wear.  This author hopes that 
this examination of the current state of gender discrimination in dress 
codes will serve to inspire the much-needed change in the American 
public school system. 
